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ABSTRACT 
ELECTRIC POWER MARKET MODELING WITH 
MULTI-AGENT REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
SEPTEMBER 2010 
NATHANAEL K. MIKSIS, M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Erin Baker 
 
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a relatively new tool for use in electric power market 
research. At heart are software agents representing real-world stakeholders in the industry: 
utilities, power producers, system operators, and regulators. Agents interact in an environment 
modeled after the real-world market and underlying physical infrastructure of modern power 
systems. Robust simulation laboratories will allow interested parties to stress test regulatory 
changes with agents motivated and able to exploit any weaknesses, before making these changes 
in the real world. Eventually ABM may help develop better understandings of electric market 
economic dynamics, clarifying both delineations and practical implications of market power. 
The research presented here builds upon work done in collateral fields of machine 
learning and computational economics, as well as academic and industry literature on electric 
power systems. We build a simplified transmission model with agents having learning 
capabilities, in order to explore agent performance under several plausible scenarios. The model 
omits significant features of modern electric power markets, but is able to demonstrate successful 
convergence to stable profit-maximizing equilibria of adaptive agents competing in a quantity-
based, available capacity model. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis reports on a research project to build an adaptive agent-based model (ABM) 
and apply it to the restructured electric power industry.  We use as a basis a learning algorithm 
developed within the field of reinforcement learning (a cross-disciplinary field originating out of 
computer science and machine learning) to model electric power generating companies in a 
simplified multi-node transmission-constrained power system, similar in kind if not in scale to 
real-world power systems (such as that operated by ISO New England Inc.).  There are myriad 
challenges ahead for researchers in this field, and these are detailed in this proposal.  However, 
equally as important is the potential value that robust and demonstrably-accurate simulation tools 
hold for applications to electric power market modeling. 
Early literature in the reinforcement learning field has already shown that optimality 
proofs exist for agents engaged in online learning in a stationary environment (Sutton and Barto, 
1998).  The challenges of using online learning algorithms in non-stationary environments, of 
which most electric power market models are examples, are described below1.  In this paper, we 
first provide an overview of the significant features of modern electricity markets that make 
modeling research particularly valuable (Section 1.1).  We then cover relevant contemporary 
research being done on more realistic market models (including multi-node transmission systems 
and more adaptive agents competing simultaneously in the same market) and some background 
                                                 
1 A stationary task is not necessarily deterministic, but one in which the effect of an action is a sample of a fixed 
probability distribution.  Through trial and error, a person or an agent can learn that the expected result of a coin flip 
is 50% heads and 50% tails and will be correct in believing this distribution to be true, but many tasks involve 
probability distributions that are not stationary.  A task in which the effect of an action depends on the action taken 
by another agent who is also learning through trial and error is one example. 
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on agent-based modeling (Section 1.3 and Chapter 2).  After that, we outline first the agent-based 
electric power market model presented in Miksis, 2006, which was a predecessor to the current 
model.  Then we detail the new model in Section 3.3, which incorporates a 5-node transmission 
model, with thermal line limits and congestion pricing (or locational marginal pricing)2.  In 
contrast to most contemporary research, and the model presented in Miksis, 2006, the agents in 
the new model compete on quantity rather than price.3 
Because quantity-based competition has received less attention than price-based models 
in the electric power ABM field, while market manipulation through physical withholding 
remains a significant potential in existing competitive markets, we hope to demonstrate the 
utility of this line of research in the field by answering several questions: 
1. Can a community of adaptive agents competing in a quantity-based market model 
achieve equilibrium under various initial conditions? 
2. Can players with plants at multiple locations (on either side of a transmission 
constraint) discover withholding policies that cause congestion, essentially raising 
prices at the import-constrained node? 
3. Does the market as a whole supply surplus capacity above load or is the average 
excess capacity margin in equilibrium close to zero? 
                                                 
2 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electricity_market#Bid-based.2C_security-
constrained.2C_economic_dispatch_with_nodal_prices 
3 Banal-Estanol and Micola, 2009, survey agent-based electricity market models and highlight the shortcomings of 
price-based competition (Bertrand models).  They mention that neither Bertrand nor Cournot (pure quantity-based) 
models are ideally suited to electricity markets because real-world markets allow variable prices over tranches of 
capacity.  We have attempted to address this by modifying traditional quantity-based competition to introduce these 
variably-priced tranches of capacity. 
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Several researchers have incorporated additional features of real world power markets 
that we were unable to incorporate, but are possible as an extension to this work, such as 
demand-side bidding and a multi-settlement (Day-Ahead and Balancing) market.  Many pressing 
questions about the effects of multi-settlement and elastic demand on market efficiency have real 
world implications and modeling these features with adaptive agents could contribute to policy 
discussions, particularly when assessment of costs-benefits of implementation is being 
considered.  The next section introduces in broad form modern electric power markets, some 
history and some distinguishing features. 
1.1. Primer on Electric Power Markets 
Here we outline the salient features of modern restructured power systems that motivate 
the research and provide an overview of recent modeling efforts.  Several recent published works 
provide excellent overviews on the most critical avenues of industry research as well as the state-
of-the-art modeling and experiment efforts, including Conzelman, et al, 2004, Ventosa, et al, 
2005, Weidlich and Veit, 2008, Nanduri and Das, 2009. 
In the last couple of decades, restructuring in the electric power industry has 
fundamentally changed the environment in which every interested party operates, from 
regulators to system operators to generation and transmission owners to load-serving power 
companies and consumers.  One thing has become clear in the move toward a competitive 
structure: Electricity is unlike any other commodity, and the existing economic and financial 
models are largely inapplicable to the study of it (Bunn and Oliveira, 2001; Ventosa, et al, 2005; 
Weidlich and Veit, 2008), while problems absent from or present only to limited degree in other 
 3
industries appear regularly in the electric power industry, such as price volatility and extreme 
market power (Stoft, 2002). 
A comprehensive introduction to the history and economic dynamics of restructured 
power markets is beyond the scope of this paper (interested readers are referred to Stoft, 2002 or 
Hunt, 2002).  That said an overview of a sort is called for.  The following features characterize 
electric power markets: 
 
1. Real-time load balancing (supply and demand must match at all times, while even 
day-ahead load forecasting, like all forecasting, is subject to error; these errors can 
have significant real-time market impacts; load balancing is also intimately 
related to other factors affecting reliability, including voltage and frequency). 
2. Undeveloped demand-side participation (while supply is at most times highly 
elastic, demand is not) (Bunn and Martoccia, 2008). 
3. Non-storability (economical large-scale storage technologies, other than pumped 
storage hydro facilities, which are limited by topography, do not exist). 
4. Physical fragility (thousands of interconnected physical components make 
contingency analysis and very conservative contingency coverage, a crucial role 
of system operators). 
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5. High market concentration (even after divestiture efforts, the generation sector 
can still be considered a semi-competitive oligopoly with a competitive fringe; 
Entriken and Wan, 2005; Somani and Tesfatsion, 2008)4. 
6. High integration of multiple related markets (fuel markets, capacity and ancillary 
services markets, bilateral contracting, as well as both day-ahead and real-time 
energy markets; emissions markets are becoming increasingly relevant, too). 
7. Temporal disconnect between investment decisions and revenue streams (with 
extreme price volatility and uncertainty with regard to regulatory changes, 
forecasting revenues to recover costs of a twenty, thirty or fifty year investment is 
difficult). 
8. Non-convexity of costs (total costs are characterized by extremely high fixed 
investment costs and relatively low variable costs). 
9. Mutable regulatory regimes. 
These nine features combine to create an electric power sector that is complex and poorly 
understood in terms of the economic dynamics, and motivate the development of novel 
sophisticated modeling tools for operations (for system operators), policy-making (for 
regulators), decision-support (for parties with vested interests in the industry) and academic 
research (Amin, 2002; Czernohous, et al, 2003; Koritarov, 2004; Sun and Tesfatsion, 2007; Bunn 
and Martoccia, 2008; Weidlich and Veit, 2008; Nanduri and Das, 2009).  While the physical 
                                                 
4 A partial exception would be systems with large vertically integrated utilities, with generation as well as 
transmission and distribution.  In these cases, generation may still be concentrated, though a significant portion of 
capacity will be controlled by entities without the profit-maximizing incentive of higher electricity prices.  
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characteristics of power systems are generally well understood, the questions of efficiency and 
social welfare that are raised by imperfect competition and market power as it is exacerbated by 
the physical and economic complexity remain.  Consequently, research into market behavior 
under imperfect competition has generally become the focus of study du jour (Bunn and 
Martoccia, 2008).  Of particular interest is whether prices reflect what could be expected of a 
fully competitive market (which we know electricity is not), and so robust, demonstrably 
accurate simulation tools for benchmarking to real-world data are a particularly sought-after 
goal. 
To briefly summarize the physical operational challenges and how the nine characterizing 
features outlined above interact, at all times supply must be balanced with demand (#1), as 
electricity is still largely a non-storable commodity except at prohibitively high costs (#3), and 
demand is highly inelastic (#2).  Complicating the picture further is the fact that the power grid is 
essentially a single large interconnected machine, with many thousands of moving parts, 
dynamic constraints and almost uncountable potential sources of failure (contingencies, in 
industry parlance), which, if unmitigated, can lead to cascading system failure (blackouts; #4).  
Consequently, system operators spend significant amounts of time on contingency analysis (CA), 
and operate the system with sufficient redundancy to be able to weather the first and second 
largest contingencies (generator or transmission line trips) without risking systemic failure.  
Additionally, real-time conditions (both forecast and not) can essentially create high market 
concentration in a small area (or system-wide in the case of a heat wave or cold snap during 
which real-time demand approaches system capacity), if transmission import capability is 
reduced through contingency or planned outage (#4 + #5). 
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The long planning horizon and high fixed costs (#7 and #8) along with the uncertainty 
and complexity that come from multiple interacting markets (#6), makes forecasting and 
investment decisions challenging for market participants.  Also, in the short history of industry 
restructuring (Orders 888 and 889, accelerating nascent existing restructuring in the United 
States, were passed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 1996; formation of 
Independent System Operators or ISOs followed in 1997), regulators and policy-makers have 
shown a tendency to refine/tweak/enhance the markets, contributing to uncertainty for market 
participants.  For more on the continuing debates surrounding market structure, readers are 
referred to (Hirst and Hadley, 1999; Besser, Farr and Tierney, 2002; Borenstein and Holland, 
2002; Stoft, 2002; Joskow, 2003; De Vries and Heijnen, 2008). 
As mentioned above, whether competitive markets achieve the goals set forth in the laws 
governing electricity and natural gas markets (the Federal Power Act and subsequent enacted 
laws) remains an open and contentious question.  A consequence of this has been that significant 
resources are regularly dedicated to refining market rules.  Thus the lack of certain robust proofs 
that competition in electricity leads necessarily to just and reasonable (a legal threshold 
frequently cited) outcomes both motivates the study of modeling tools and complicates the 
development of them. 
Of special recent interest has been the development of what has been termed a “smart 
grid.”  According to a National Energy Technology Laboratory report on “the Modern Grid,” a 
central component to a smart grid is advanced simulation capabilities to support system operator 
training under dynamic conditions (NETL, 2007).  In this context, the ability to simulate both the 
learning and acting capabilities of all actors in a power system that is changing is critical to 
enhance system operator situational awareness for greater reliability (U.S.-Canada Power System 
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Outage Task Force, 2005; Overbye and Wiegmann, 2005).  This could be considered a second 
parallel motivation, as robust simulation of economic dynamics becomes increasingly crucial 
under changing industry conditions (distributed smart-grid technologies and automated 
sophisticated protection systems throughout the transmission system). 
1.2. Pressing Questions in Electric Power Market Regulation and Design 
Increasingly, the question of whether current market designs provide the proper 
incentives to ensure levels of investment needed for a reliable electricity system has surrounded 
debates about the future of power systems under liberalized energy markets5.  The novelty of 
these debates is not surprising, as electricity was long considered a good that required high levels 
of centralized coordination in both short and long-term decision-making in order to, as the saying 
goes, “Keep the lights on.”  It has long been understood that the electric power system is a 
unique and especially delicate network requiring close constant attention and centralized 
operation.  Thus, the concept of reliability in industry literature has long been recognized.  
However, responsibility for maintaining reliability was more clearly established and assigned 
under the former paradigm of highly regulated, vertically-integrated utilities, and reliability was 
ensured through investments in new and upgraded generation assets based on technical 
calculations of loss of load probability (or LOLP), with remuneration for capacity investments 
determined by state regulatory agencies (Viscusi et al, 2000). 
In recent years, the question of whether market operation can indeed provide the right 
incentives for maintaining sufficient levels of available electric power generating capacity has 
                                                 
5 Andrew Ford (2002), showed empirically and through computer simulation how electricity markets are prone to 
boom-bust cycles similar to other commodity markets.  This phenomenon is especially dangerous in electricity 
simply because of the complexity and fragility of the system as a whole.  When demand outstrips supply, the 
integrity of the system can be compromised, price volatility notwithstanding. 
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come to the fore in industry trade journals, among academic researchers and industry participants 
(Jaffe & Felder, 1996; Besser, Farr & Tierney, 2002; De Vries & Hakvoort, 2004; Baldick et al, 
2005; Cramton & Stoft, 2005).  There remains no consensus on the answer, and real world 
experiences in market implementation vary significantly worldwide.  Generally, proponents of 
the position that a separate mechanism is needed to ensure adequacy maintain that electricity is a 
commodity with particularities that prevent a pure spot market from simultaneously providing 
enough revenue for producers and shielding consumers from extreme price volatility (Besser, 
Farr and Tierney, 2002).   
The question of how adequacy is defined is also a contentious issue, particularly with 
regard to the fact that capacity adequacy in many other industries is not an issue of public 
concern.  Hirst and others have argued that adequacy should not be predetermined, but should be 
discovered implicitly by market interactions (Hirst and Hadley, 1999; Rochlin, 2004).  This 
position holds that energy reserves, like energy itself, can be a private good.  The argument goes 
that electricity reserve, which is generation capacity that is available on very short notice, fails 
the test of a public good.  It can be bought and sold privately, if spot energy prices are allowed to 
fluctuate unconstrained.  If given the opportunity end-users who currently are not exposed to 
time-of-use-based prices for electricity would begin to treat electricity like other consumption 
commodities, and the efficiencies of the market model would improve today’s power systems. 
Another position holds that the definition of resource adequacy really has not changed 
qualitatively from the days of integrated and regulated monopolies.  Those in this camp generally 
maintain that reliability is a public good, one that the energy-only market will always under-
provide. They highlight that while capacity and reserves are private goods, the extra service they 
provide in the form of increased system security must be remunerated through another channel 
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beyond the energy spot market (Jaffe & Felder, 1996; Farr and Felder, 2005).  A general rule of 
thumb used in the United States is that put forward by the North American Electric Reliability 
Council (NERC), which maintains that adequacy is defined as the level of capacity necessary to 
ensure no more than one day of outages (lost or curtailed load) in ten years. 
In some of the original literature on the subject of electricity markets, it was shown that a 
model consisting of an energy-only spot market for electricity could provide sufficient incentives 
for capacity investment and would result in both short and long term efficiency (Schweppe, 
1978; Caramanis, 1982; Caramanis et al, 1982).  Later work in the field built on this foundation 
economic model and many today argue that a pure spot market can result in a socially optimal 
outcome (Shuttleworth, 1997; Hirst and Hadley, 1999).  Stoft (2002, 2003) maintains that while 
the pure model could work with defined energy price caps, determining the proper cap is difficult 
and setting it improperly could do more harm than no caps at all. 
Many others have built upon this contention and concluded that, while the model would 
work given the assumptions made, energy-only markets cannot adequately ensure capacity levels 
necessary for system reliability due to certain fundamental characteristics of electric power 
systems such as are discussed below (Jaffe and Felder, 1996; Besser, Farr and Tierney, 2002; 
Bidwell and Henney, 2004; De Vries and Hakvoort, 2004; Cramton and Stoft, 2005).  Some have 
highlighted that the complexities surrounding liberalized markets in modern power systems 
require that markets (for energy, ancillary services and capacity, where it is included) be 
carefully designed in concert, while the real necessity of capacity mechanisms of any form is an 
open question (Baldick et al, 2005).  Jaffe and Felder (1996) propose that installed capacity 
requirements contribute to reliability, by lowering the estimated loss of load probability (the 
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likelihood that demand will not be met), and that this contribution cannot be reflected and valued 
in the spot market. 
The specific characteristics that are highlighted which can lead to market failure vary.  
Baldick et al (2005) provide an overview of the particular characteristics of electricity markets 
that make application of standard economic theory to market design difficult.  They and others 
mention that many of the assumptions made in consideration of economic models for power 
markets cannot be realistically made.  Jaffe and Felder put forward the idea that there exist 
certain significant externalities to production and consumption of electricity that distort the 
market’s operation; They argue that the spot energy market cannot reflect the changes to system 
reliability that result from capacity investments and load changes, and thus those who lower 
overall reliability are not charged while those who contribute are not remunerated.  This idea of 
market externalities and free-ridership has been the subject of hot debate (Shuttleworth, 1997; 
Jaffe and Felder, 1996; Hirst, 1999; Rochlin 2004).  Physical characteristics of power systems 
and incumbent technologies have also been highlighted as contributing factors in market failure, 
among them the inherited system of rate-based retail pricing which removes demand 
participation from the market (Stoft, 2002). 
According to many authors, one specific characteristic of electric power systems that 
distinguishes electricity from other commodities is the inability for significant economical 
storage.  Without the ability to store electricity, consumers who require service cannot choose to 
purchase excess when prices are low and forego purchases when prices rise.  In this way, the 
primary rationing mechanism of markets cannot function and consumers may be subject to 
extreme price volatility (Creti and Fabra, 2003).  In light of this, most power systems have been 
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built and operated so that consumers do not face real time prices, but pay a preset rate for energy 
largely without regard to time-of-use. 
There is general consensus that the lack of robust demand-side participation in electricity 
markets causes considerable problems for market operation (Hirst and Hadley, 1999; Fraser, 
2001; Borenstein and Holland, 2002; Stoft, 2002; Creti & Fabra, 2003; Joskow, 2003; Rochlin 
2004; Baldick et al, 2005; Cramton & Stoft, 2005).  When the idealized market model is 
proposed as a proper mechanism for pricing and distribution of resources in most contexts, a 
general assumption is made that both supply and demand participate, expressing their 
preferences in terms of prices and quantities.  In power systems historically, on the other hand, 
most consumers have received service insulated from the real-time circumstances in the 
generation process. 
In testimony before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Joskow (2003) 
highlights certain attributes of an ideal energy market.  Topping the list are the ability for 
consumers to see and have the ability to respond to spot market prices, to express their valuation 
of reliability of service in market transactions, have available various financial and contractual 
tools to manage their risks and have the incentive to use them efficiently.  For the most part, 
these features are missing from power systems.  Stoft (2002) and others argue that there are a 
number of reasons why most consumers do not make their market decisions in real time, 
including metering technology and the inherited retail service structure highlighted above.  
Fraser (2001) argues that unresponsive demand is the primary factor necessitating “socialized 
reliability solutions,” or capacity margins, because consumers are unable to express their value 
of reliability in the marketplace. 
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Other authors have cited the implementation of price caps in many markets (suppressing 
legitimately high on-peak prices), risk aversion among investors and the exercise of market 
power in concentrated systems as contributing to the failure of the spot market model to provide 
sufficient available capacity (Oren, 2003; Vazquez et al, 2002; De Vries and Hakvoort, 2004).  
Risk aversion, described by De Vries and Hakvoort as discouraging otherwise economic 
investments, can be related to many underlying factors, including uncertainty surrounding future 
revenue streams and possible regulatory and legislative action.  Price caps are a feature in many 
energy markets designed to shield consumers from extreme scarcity rents that could be charged 
in shortage times.  Many authors have suggested that this cap on prices makes recovery of fixed 
costs in energy markets impossible, especially so because the electricity industry has such large 
fixed costs relative to operating/variable costs. 
Given the widespread belief among many in the field that energy-only markets cannot be 
relied upon to ensure generation adequacy, a number of solutions have been proposed.  The most 
common type has been a form of capacity payment designed to provide an administratively 
determined proxy value of available capacity to the marketplace, and to provide producers with 
revenue to cover fixed costs.  In its most basic form, the capacity payment is intended to address 
the shortfall in fixed-cost-recovery created by a non-market determination of capacity adequacy 
above the market equilibrium (Felder and Farr, 2005).  Other proposals have included capacity 
obligations placed on producers or on load, reliability contracts, energy options, mothball 
reserves, and capacity subscriptions (Vazquez et al, 2002; Stoft, 2002; Doorman, 2003; Chao and 
Wilson, 2004; Oren, 2003).  The creation of forward reserve markets in the New England power 
system has been another effort to provide additional revenue to generators that provide a 
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premium capacity good in the form of quickly dispatchable generation capability held in reserve 
(Cramton, Chao and Wilson, 2005). 
Cramton and Stoft (2005) and others make the case that a capacity mechanism is 
necessary in most deregulated power systems because of the negligible levels of demand 
participation in the market for energy.  They point out that past efforts at implementing capacity 
markets, when they were done, were often fatally flawed and that well-designed capacity 
markets can serve to ensure generation adequacy and remain politically feasible when coupled 
with energy price caps. 
Experiences with implemented energy markets have varied across the globe.  Some 
power systems have relied entirely on price signals and investment incentives from the spot 
market to provide the proper investments in generation capacity.  Most European power systems 
operate this way, as does the Australian system.  In the U.S., the most visible experience with 
energy-only markets was the widely publicized string of price spikes and rolling blackouts in 
California in the summer of 2000.6  Weare, 2003, in a report on the California crisis, estimated 
that total costs to the state amounted to between $40 billion and $45 billion, or 3.5% of annual 
gross state output. 
In the northeastern U.S., the markets implemented in 1999 and modifications presently 
under consideration have included some type of extra mechanism to ensure generation capacity 
investment (“installed capacity” or ICAP) as well as investment in peaking capacity (“forward 
                                                 
6 It should be noted, however, that other factors contributed besides market structure: While consensus on the causes 
remains somewhat elusive, one contributing was that utilities who had been compelled to divest of many of their 
generation assets were forced through circumstances to procure energy for their customers and in some cases 
unexpected new customers on unfavorable terms in a chaotic environment.  Weare, 2003, is an excellent source of 
more information. 
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reserve market” or FRM) used to ensure energy reserves that the pure market would undersupply 
(Cramton and Stoft, 2005). 
Because private decisions about investment in a deregulated industry are made by market 
participants based on the predicted profitability of a plant (using calculations of expected fixed 
and variable costs and forecast revenue streams), addressing whether current and proposed 
energy and ancillary service markets provide the right incentives is critical.  The original 
literature on electricity pricing in spot markets was predicated on certain assumptions of 
underlying market fundamentals.  Debate has focused in recent years on whether many of these 
assumptions are valid.  Because of the centrality of electricity to economic growth and 
prosperity, as well as the potential risks posed by insecure power systems, the concern of 
whether implemented market models can ensure socially optimal levels of reliable service is 
central to policy discussions.  The next section introduces some contemporary applications of 
agent-based modeling to electric power markets. 
1.3. How Agent-Based Modeling Has Been Used in Electric Power Market Applications 
Ventosa, et al, 2005 distinguishes three types of modeling commonly used in the study of 
electric power markets: optimization models, equilibrium models and simulation (or agent-
based) models.  Although there has been some overlap, this categorization serves an important 
purpose in offering a foundation for researchers working in a field that has occasionally lacked 
commonality of methods to facilitate reproducibility (this criticism has been lodged by Weidlich 
and Veit, 2008). 
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Optimization models restrict the analysis to the decision process of a single firm within a 
complex market, and are the least explored of the three types.  The second type, equilibrium 
models, attempts to solve a mathematical program representing the decisions of all participants 
in closed form.  These are typically either Cournot (quantity-based) or Supply Function 
Equilibrium (quantity and price-based) models, and have received significant attention both 
independently and as part of benchmarking efforts for the third type, simulation (Klemperer and 
Meyer, 1989; Hobbs and Helman, 2004; Waltman and Kaymak, 2008).  Because simulation is 
the approach to be used here, interested readers are referred to Ventosa, et al, 2005 for more 
literature on non-simulation electric power market modeling. 
The third modeling approach, simulation, here referred to synonymously as agent-based 
modeling (ABM), or sometimes as agent-based computational economics (ACE), has received 
significant attention for its general framework and the ability to surmount many of the 
computational limitations of equilibrium models (Fagiolo, et al, 2007).  Many equilibrium 
models suffer from the inability to model more than very simplified transmission systems and 
few active decision-makers (Hobbs and Helman, 2004).  On the other hand, ABM, while 
potentially a very powerful modeling tool usable for almost every conceivable application related 
to power market analysis and transmission systems of complexity approaching the real world, 
has some crucial weaknesses (which are all-to-infrequently emphasized in most ABM literature), 
and has received its own share of criticism.  Most often, these are criticisms of the modelers, 
whose results are presented without a) benchmarked results or b) robust proofs of the relevance 
of the results (Weidlich and Veit, 2008).  On the other hand, with the spread of ABM concepts 
among applied economics researchers, greater attention has recently been paid to these 
omissions, including renewed efforts at benchmarking results against real-world observed 
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phenomena (Fagiolo, et al, 2007) and defining common frameworks for easy comparison 
(Midgley, et al, 2007; Marks, 2007).  Leombruni and Richiardi, 2005, offer a useful summary of 
remaining issues with ABM methodology in their exploration of why it hasn’t received greater 
attention from top-ranking journals. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AGENT-BASED MODELING: THE CONTEXT OF THIS RESEARCH 
The project below is an application of agent-based modeling using reinforcement 
learning (a popular machine learning approach).  As described above, electric power market 
modeling has taken three general forms, although there has been some overlap: Optimization 
models, equilibrium models and simulation models (Ventosa, et al, 2005).  Simulation models, of 
which the proposed research project is one, are useful for situations in which the complexity of 
the desired model makes equilibrium analysis impractical. In a simulation model, firms are 
represented as autonomous agents, where the structure of the agents is general (much research in 
the collateral field of machine learning regards agent structures and the performance of these 
agents under various types of environments; see below for greater depth of coverage on agent 
models, or Kaelbling, Littman and Moore, 1996 or Sutton and Barto, 1998). A fourth model that 
has received little attention and is omitted mention in Ventosa, et al, 2008, is human-subject 
experiments, in which human players take on the role of a generation firm.  A possible reason for 
this for this omission, and a motivating factor in agent-based modeling, is that the learning curve 
for operating a portfolio of assets even in a much simplified market is steep for human-subjects, 
making experiments of this form of limited utility (Weidlich and Veit, 2008).7 
Agent-based modeling is a simulation technique particularly suitable to the study of 
complex systems, such as electric power markets, for which analytical, closed form, solutions do 
not exist or are impractical to discover.  While there are several ABM approaches that have been 
                                                 
7 This isn’t to say that the learning curve for a computer agent is much shorter, but an ideal adaptive agent, lacking 
in heuristics that humans can use, for better or worse, may be able to learn the complex tasks faster due to 
computational speed advantages. 
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applied to modeling electricity markets, the most prevalent use adaptive agents with some type 
of a reinforcement learning algorithm for online learning.  Reinforcement learning is 
significantly founded on Thorndike’s Law of Effect, in which those actions an agent (or animal) 
takes which result in immediate positive reward will be repeated more often and vice versa.  A 
drawback to ABM, which has been mentioned throughout the literature, is precisely that proofs 
of optimality or even demonstration of realism through benchmarking are difficult and these 
limitations have received little attention relative to the substantial reported work in the field 
(Weidlich and Veit, 2008)8. 
However, a counterbalancing factor is that much ABM research borrows lessons and 
insights from substantial existing research in the fields of artificial intelligence and reinforcement 
learning (Bunn and Oliveira, 2001; Bagnall and Smith, 2005; Veit, et al, 2006).  An example in 
the field is Waltman and Kaymak, 2008, in which they demonstrate both analytically and 
through ABM in a Cournot market that Q-Learning agents collude to raise prices above a 
competitive equilibrium.9 
At the root of ABM are the agents that act autonomously according to their own 
individual algorithms and the rules of the model.  The general structure involves an agent that in 
a single stage or iteration of the simulation takes an action according to its policy, receives 
information and a reward (or calculates the reward itself from the environment message passed 
to it) and updates its policy by which future actions will be selected.  ABM is especially useful 
                                                 
8 Benchmarking is difficult for another reason, namely that industry data are often hard to retrieve, and that market 
outcomes are significantly impacted by operating procedures which, though they attempt to balance reliability and 
cost reasonably, are constantly evolving and differ from control area to control area. 
9 Occasionally, the term Q-Learning is used synonymously with learning that simply utilizes a general reinforcement 
update algorithm.  Strictly speaking, Q-Learning relates more to dynamic programming, in which reward values are 
backpropagated from values of subsequent states and actions to those of antecedent states and actions.  Q-Learning 
particularly is “off-policy”, contrasted with “on-policy” learning, but this distinction is beyond the scope of this 
report.  See Sutton and Barto, 1998 for more (available free online at 
http://webdocs.cs.ualberta.ca/~sutton/book/ebook/index.html) 
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for studying complex systems that are not easily analyzed with traditional modeling techniques, 
in particular in the case of economic systems, where the real subjects of interest are often the 
emergent macro-phenomena that result from interactions between hundreds, thousands or 
millions of economic actors.  While laboratory game experiments using human participants as 
generators can discover market flaws at risk for exploitation, there is a limit to how complex a 
system can be analyzed in these economic experiments.  Especially in the case of real-world 
power systems, suppliers often control multiple plants in different locations on the transmission 
grid (often in multi-settlement or multi-stage markets with more than one product) and the 
learning curve for a human playing the part of a supplier with a portfolio of these plants can be 
steep, often prohibitively so. 
Adaptive-agent-based modeling is especially suited to analyzing electricity markets (with 
certain important caveats, high among them the exponential relationship between environment 
complexity and task complexity) because participating agents can often quickly search through 
their policy-space for successful strategies even given a potentially very complex problem to 
address.  Many obstacles exist to reaching this goal of building agents able to learn strategies in 
environments of great complexity (such as the non-stationary nature of an environment 
composed of more than one learning agent), and some of these are detailed in this report, but 
overall experience to date has shown promise in this field.  The motivation for the work 
described in this report comes from the observation that the field of agent design is relatively 
new and many potential avenues of research into agent design (and the suitability of particular 
designs to electric power market modeling) have not yet been exhaustively explored. 
Generally there have been two approaches researchers have taken to ABM over the last 
couple of decades.  One has been to attempt to design agents that approximate the behavior of 
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human-subjects (Erev and Roth, 1995), while the other has disregarded benchmarking agent 
behavior to those of humans and explored emergent phenomena in environments with many 
agents following simple heuristics in decision-making (Bunn and Bower, 1999, for example).  
The results of these early experiments showed the potential of ABM to model complex 
phenomena emerging from simple foundations.  Approaching the field of ABM from the 
direction of benchmarking, Axelrod (1987) used genetic algorithms to model agents participating 
in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Erev and Roth (1998) built upon this work with agents 
participating in simple games in a study on using learning algorithms to predict how humans 
learn to play matrix games10 with mixed-strategy equilibria.  More recently, Abdallah and Lesser 
(2008) have provided further analysis of the performance of a community of reinforcement 
learning agents, evaluating the convergence capabilities of several learning algorithms on some 
standard matrix-payoff games with pure and mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria.  Nicolaisen, et al 
(2001) explores applications of a modified Roth-Erev (MRE) reinforcement learning algorithm 
in electricity market simulations, and has the advantage of using agent models that have been 
demonstrated to realistically approximate human behavior in simple applications in relatively 
complex power systems (incorporating a multi-node transmission model; Somani and Tesfatsion, 
2008).  Other applications of ABM to electricity markets are covered in (Bower and Bunn, 1999; 
Bunn and Oliveira, 2001; Bagnall and Smith, 2005).  Bagnall and Smith, 2005, applies ABM to 
                                                 
10 Littman, 1994, describes a matrix game, in the context of game theory, as simply a deterministic reward function 
Ri,j for the first of two agents choosing action i and their opponent choosing action j.  And offers the zero-sum game 
“rock, paper, scissors” in their exploration of Q-Learning in a multi-agent context: 
 
(Agent 1 reward, Agent 2 reward) Rock Paper Scissors 
Rock (0, 0) (-1, 1) (1, -1) 
Paper (1, -1) (0, 0) (-1, 1) 
Scissors (-1, 1) (1, -1) (0, 0) 
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the UK electricity markets under the New Electricity Trading Agreement (or NETA) using 
relatively sophisticated learning classifier system agents that incorporate a genetic algorithm 
applied to encoded rules of behavior. 
Agents that can develop policies through trial-and-error interaction with their 
environments are especially interesting for use in agent-based modeling.  Well-designed adaptive 
agents have the potential to independently discover strategies in complex environments beyond 
what can be reasonably hard-coded into heuristic agents or expected of human game-
participants.  In this way, some of the key benefits of human-participant experimental economics 
(discovery of unforeseen strategies/policies) can be incorporated into more robust modeling tools 
for real world applications.  On the other hand, sufficiently complex adaptive agents can retain 
the ability for direct optimization (when such programming subroutines are part of their action 
sets) in decision-making that human participants cannot (Bagnall and Smith, 2005 describe their 
process of agent-design clearly; Dariani, et al, 2008 treat precise design of both adaptive and 
non-adaptive agents with several parts, of which a value function for determining a policy can be 
one).  This capability is especially relevant for ABM applications to electricity markets because a 
successful power supplier strategy may require close coordination between generating plants 
controlled by the agent at different locations on the power grid.  Relatively sophisticated agents 
capable of solving these complex problems using mathematical programming with equilibrium 
constraints (MPECs) have been implemented in modeled electricity markets (an example of 
combining optimization modeling with simulation; Entriken and Wan, 2005).  There may be 
significant promise in combining agent learning with these existing mathematical programming 
tools available to an agent, but the author is unaware of this sort of application to date. 
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Essentially an adaptive agent competing in a modeled market is faced with the task of 
discovering strategies that will maximize their profits (or in some cases attempt to optimize with 
respect to multiple objectives) by searching the space of potential policies through online 
interaction with their environment (other agents and the market clearing mechanism or market 
module).  The complexity of agents that have been implemented in market models varies widely, 
as do the broad agent structures used. 
In early work on reinforcement learning, optimality proofs were demonstrated for an 
agent learning in a stationary environment (not necessarily deterministic, but stochastic with 
fixed probability distributions). When the task faced by a learning agent is non-stationary (which 
it is whenever a second learning agent is part of the market environment), the optimality proofs 
provided in many reinforcement learning agent research (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton 
and Barto, 1998) may not exist. 
2.1. Challenges and Opportunities 
There are many challenges to developing robust electric power system models with 
adaptive agents, many of which were described above.  Perhaps the greatest challenge involves 
building confidence in the results.  Section 1.1 introduced the most relevant complicating factors 
of electric power markets and provided some treatment of the motivations for this research.  Here 
we summarize the greatest challenges facing ABM researchers in exploring dynamics of realistic 
electric power markets in their models. 
1. Electric power systems are complex. 
2. The dynamics of competitive electricity markets are poorly understood. 
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3. Analytical solutions are mostly or completely unattainable for optimal behavior in 
even relatively simple models of electric power systems (this is especially true for 
multi-agent models and for other models incorporating non-stationary 
phenomena). 
4. Human-participant experiments are of limited use in electric power market 
models, due to the complexity of the task an agent with a portfolio of generating 
plants participating in multiple inter-connected markets faces. 
5. Agent-based modeling is a relatively new tool for modeling economic systems, 
but offers promise as a compromise environment for evaluating market structures 
and participant behavior. 
6. Most models lack realism (real world power markets, as described above, are 
complex, interconnected, multi-faceted and mutable). 
7. Lack of realism of the agents (even the most sophisticated agents have limitations 
that become pronounced as the complexity of the task environment increases). 
8. Proprietary nature of power system data. 
9. Non-scalability of existing agent learning models to realistic scenarios.  Even 
those multi-agent reinforcement learning models which demonstrate convergence 
in non-stationary environments have only been applied to very simple games. 
This research project is motivated by several interconnected factors, and is an attempt to 
address as many of these issues as possible.  First, there is a well-understood need to have 
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electric power market modeling tools that can reliably and quickly approximate real-world 
conditions and predict market behavior under variable conditions.  To a significant extent, 
research to date has either been devoted to modeling the physical power system as accurately as 
possible and omitting strategic participant behavior (including state estimators used in ISO 
system operations, and generator commitment and dispatch algorithms are examples), or has 
sacrificed the detail of most physical power systems to focus on agent behavior.  Some 
exceptions that attempt both include work reported in Conzelman, et al, 2004, Bagnall and 
Smith, 2005, Sun and Tesfatsion, 2006, and Somani and Tesfatsion, 2008.  The model detailed 
here incorporates, as mentioned before, a multi-node transmission model with locational 
marginal prices, features central to the Standard Market Design put forward by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission in its early orders mandating a move towards open competitive 
electric power markets.  Other features that will be necessary to incorporate into future models 
include multi-settlement systems, non-linear commitment and dispatch algorithms, dynamic 
load, demand-side participation and more.11 
Second, there continues to be insufficient acknowledgement of the particular strengths 
and weaknesses of reinforcement learning-based agents used in ABM research.  This has likely 
been caused by the inaccessibility of much reinforcement learning research to those who are not 
theorists in the field, combined with a possibly unjustified confidence among electric power 
market modeling practitioners in the abilities of these agents in complex multi-agent 
                                                 
11 Veit, et al, 2006 do incorporate these features into a model similar to the one used in our research, but the 
complexity introduced there is not explicitly addressed for its impact on the dimensionality of the agents’ tasks. In 
general learning agents must sample from their action set a very large number of times (positively proportional to 
the number of possible environment states) in order to learn a task.  While non-stationary task environments, such as 
two interacting learning agents comprise, admittedly do not have convergence or optimality proofs, as the ratio of 
possible environment states to the number of rounds run in a simulation increases, so does the chance that particular 
states are never encountered, which intuitively adversely impacts learning in a multi-agent environment. 
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environments (this author has been one).  While recent attempts have been made to demonstrate 
analytically the applicability of Q-Learning agents (such as Waltman and Kaymak, 2008) far too 
little attention has been paid to robustly demonstrate the advantages of adaptive agents in electric 
power market models. 
Any attempt at modeling a complex environment must begin with an understanding of 
both the capabilities and limitations of the tools available as well as a vision of the endgame 
(what features an ideal product would have).  The obstacles to implementing learning algorithms 
in models such as this one, that are well known in the reinforcement learning community, 
include the challenges of representing continuous and high-dimensional environments for an 
agent to develop realistic situational awareness (see “the curse of dimensionality”; Bertsekas and 
Tsitsiklas, 1996), and the significant amount of time, in terms of both modeling rounds and 
computing time, needed for optimal behavior to be learned (in cases where optimality proofs 
exist) or convergence to be achieved (if it does at all).  For these reasons researchers in electric 
power market modeling commonly sacrifice some aspects of an ideal agent structure for 
tractability (with good reason, although often these sacrifices are left unacknowledged).  A 
frequent sacrifice made is to omit state awareness and take advantage of evidence provided in 
earlier work on the realism of agent-learning and behavior with respect to human learning (Erev 
and Roth’s work on predicting human game playing with reinforcement learning agents is widely 
cited, and widely used; Sun and Tesfatsion, 2006, Veit et al, 2006, Somani and Tesfatsion, 
2008).  However, without state awareness, agents are essentially blind to market conditions.12  A 
compensating effort that is common is to benchmark results of a multi-agent model with real-
                                                 
12 This shortcoming is a factor in the present version of the market model, but state awareness (and all the challenges 
accompanying it) is a feature that will have to be incorporated in future multi-agent reinforcement learning research 
on electric power markets. 
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world data, although comprehensive attribution of specific agent features and modeling 
assumptions to simulation results is lacking (Fagioli, et al, 2008).  Another challenge is the 
limited availability of much power system data, as they are owned by private entities including 
system operators, transmission owners and electric utilities. 
The reinforcement learning literature is particularly valuable for its attention to 
categorizing task environments that agents face.  From the simple Markov decision process 
(MDP, which has the Markov property) to partially observable Markov decision processes 
(POMDPs) and non-stationary POMDPs (the latter two of which don’t have the Markov 
property), the limitations imposed on the research are explicitly acknowledged.  From this 
literature, it is possible to glean insights into the task that a representative agent in a market 
model environment faces (Littman, 1994 does a good job of this).  In most research applications 
that utilize reinforcement learning, the task environment isn’t explicitly described (Xiong, 
Okuma and Fujita, 2004; Rahimiyan and Mashhadi, 2008).  This is the case with almost all ABM 
models cited here. This makes the extension of work such as Abdallah and Lesser, 2008, (in 
which the task environment is explicitly described in terms of joint reward functions) to complex 
environments difficult, though in their paper, the authors cite some promising directions being 
explored in multi-agent learning applications in iterative matrix games involving a general 
number of agents, beyond the two that Abdallah and Lesser use (Tuyls, et al, 2006). 
Some promising recent research has been done in the RL field on so-call multi-agent 
reinforcement learning (MARL) applications (of which this research project is one; Krause, et al, 
2005; Abdallah and Lesser, 2008).  In these lines of research, the non-stationary stochastic nature 
of the single-agent’s task (reward function) is placed within the context of a community of 
agents, in which case the payoff to all agents is a deterministic function of the agents’ collective 
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actions (a mapping from joint-policy space to a vector of rewards to each agent).13  Abdallah and 
Lesser report on work they’ve done to explore learning processes and convergence of various 
learning algorithms in non-stationary n-armed bandit problems (the single-agent perspective of 
multi-agent games with known pure or mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria).  The primary difficulty 
with borrowing too much from this line of exploration is that many of the most interesting 
applications are ones where payoff functions of joint-policies are not clear, particularly in the as-
yet unapplied electric market model incorporating realistic features of existing power systems 
(multi-node transmission system with locational market pricing, multi-settlement rules, ancillary 
services, stochastic loads, price-responsive demand, etc.). 
Often, in much of the electric power market ABMs, explicit framing of the task 
environment is left out because either classification is difficult or would be unhelpful even if the 
class were known.  This is the case with almost ABM to date applications (present company 
included) that use reinforcement learning.  Reinforcement learning has been proven to discover 
optimal behavior only under extremely restrictive assumptions, including properly-calibrated 
parameter adjustments and a stationary environment (Sutton and Barto, 1998), some that are 
necessarily missing from all simulations in which more than one adaptive agent is used (such as 
Xiong, Okuma and Fujita, 2004; Rahimiyan and Mashhadi, 2008).  This is because the presence 
of another adaptive agent makes the environment non-stationary and non-Markov. 
To the author’s knowledge, little of the most recent research in reinforcement learning  
(such as Abdallah and Lesser, 2008) has been utilized in agent-based modeling of electric power 
                                                 
13 The task environment in the model described below is technically a matrix game, although with 225 possible 
combinations of actions, explicit framing of the joint-reward function under varied topologies and plant-node 
assignments is prohibitive.  The otherwise excellent model presented in Veit, et al, contains an [estimated] 3.25 * 
10128 possible joint actions and environment states, making it impractical for agents to fully learn tasks, unless 
generalization is used in the learning algorithms (see Sutton and Barto, 1998 for very good treatment of 
generalization in reinforcement learning). 
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markets.  This is a primary motivator for the research below, although the omission of state 
representation leaves something to be desired in modeling power markets, particularly those 
models that would incorporate multi-settlement market features and inter-temporal constraints. 
There is a necessary trade-off when you move from a task environment with a 
reinforcement learning agent that is embedded in an environment having the Markov property to 
one that doesn’t.  When you leave the Markov property behind, you enter the realm where 
success is measured by convergence and benchmarking against real-world data, and this is often 
tenuous. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ELECTRICITY MARKET MODEL 
Green and Newberry (1992) and others have made the case for using quantity-based or 
supply function modeling, as equilibrium results of Bertrand (price-based analysis) models show 
competitive outcomes in even very concentrated markets, which is counterintuitive and 
contradicted by results from other models (Banal-Estanol and Micola, 2009).  Another case that 
can be made for using quantity-based or supply function-based models is that they have greater 
realism: In most extant competitive electric power markets, the exercise of market power through 
price-manipulation is closely monitored and mitigated through robust rules and market monitors 
endowed with non-trivial referral authority.  Less well understood is the effect of physical 
withholding on market outcomes, particularly because generator outages and reductions are a 
common occurrence, even unplanned ones (or “forced outages”).  Therefore, absent blatant 
misrepresentation or an incriminating paper trail, anticompetitive manipulation of physical 
parameters is challenging to catch and to prove, although penalties for misrepresentation of an 
asset’s availability (whether in-service when it is not, or vice versa) are nontrivial.  For this 
reason, we constructed a market model in which agents compete on quantity rather than price (an 
advantage is that the path here isn’t entirely untrod; Waltman and Kaymak, 2008, also explored 
using Q-Learning agents in a Cournot model, as did Veit, et al, 2006).  The market model 
contains a clearing engine built upon an open-sourced mathematical optimization package (LP 
Solve14), which has a multi-node transmission system with locational marginal pricing (LMP). 
                                                 
14 lpsolve.sourceforge.net/5.5/ 
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The motivation for this research is to further development of flexible, scalable and 
reliable market models.  The promise of these goals are models that can help training of system 
operators, regulatory/policy-making, refining of market rules and general understanding of the 
short-run and long-run dynamics of competitive electric power markets under general initial 
conditions. 
3.1. Where This Research Fits: What’s New Under the Sun? 
The agent-based model we developed and describe below finds good company among 
those that have been reviewed and reported on in the contemporary literature on modeling 
electricity markets.  Inspired by early results of agent-based electric power market modeling 
(such as Bunn and Bower, 1999) and reinforcement learning applications in stationary and 
cooperative tasks (Littman, 1994; Sutton and Barto, 1998, Nicolaisen, et al, 2001, and others), 
development of linearized direct-current optimal power flow models (Chao and Peck, 1996), 
first-hand experience with system operations15 and recent work exploring convergence of multi-
agent reinforcement learning models in matrix games (Abdallah and Lesser, 2009), the model 
described here attempts to incorporate lessons from disparate fields to both identify avenues of 
improvement to the existing body of electric power ABM research, and demonstrate tractability 
in a simplified case.  The intention is to contribute to this exciting field in several ways: 
First, the economic model used in this research project closely resembles the real-world 
conditions of the power industry we are attempting to simulate.  As Banal-Estanol and Micola, 
2009, and others have noted, real-world generator owners typically bid their units in piecewise 
tranches of capacity, as our agents do.  Additionally, operating costs of most widely-used 
                                                 
15 Some of the work reported here was done during a period of time when the author was also an employee of ISO 
New England Inc.’s Internal Market Monitoring Unit (INTMMU).  No non-public information is disclosed here. 
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generator technologies are known to be within a narrow range around a linear relationship with 
fuel prices.  With most power systems incorporating robust price-mitigation measures, market 
manipulation through price manipulation is both difficult and rare.  A more practical and difficult 
to detect method of manipulation involves capacity withholding, either through complete plant 
outages, partial plant reductions or misrepresentation of operating parameters.  It is our 
contention that more research on quantity-based models is appropriate. 
Second, as several other researchers, but not all, have also done, we incorporate a 
transmission system into the model.  We show that this is both practical and the agents 
successfully converge to equilibria that take advantage of transmission congestion to increase 
profits. 
Third, although we were not able to incorporate those newly developed learning 
algorithms that have demonstrated success in complex non-cooperative games where others, 
such as the Q-Learning update algorithm we use, fail, the model is immensely flexible for future 
extension.  As additional market features are incorporated into agent-based models (day-ahead 
commitment and dispatch, with real-time balancing, ancillary services and demand-
participation), it is expected that equilibria (if existence is shown) will be more difficult for 
agents to discover, in which case new and different learning algorithms will be needed. 
3.2. Predecessor Model 
The first version of the market model described in this report consisted of a simple 
electric power market with two or more agents competing to supply fixed demand by submitting 
price offers for their full capacity up to an offer cap of $2016.  There was no transmission model 
                                                 
16 These results were earlier presented in Miksis, 2006. 
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(like the current version described below contains).  The decision process of the adaptive agents 
(to distinguish from the fixed-action agent that submitted a single static price offer every round) 
was to modify their previous round price offer by one of several multiplier factors (0.5 to 2).  
Consistent with previous research in reinforcement learning agents in a stationary task, initial 
simulations showed that an adaptive agent could successfully discover optimal behavior in 
several load scenarios.  In each round, the market module solicited actions from each agent and 
ran a least-cost optimization to match supply with demand.  Three scenarios were run and 
reported on: 
The first scenario involved a single adaptive Q-Learning agent (with a cost of $0) 
competing against a static opponent offering a constant price.  Each agent had a fixed capacity of 
1,000 MW, while load was also 1,000 MW.  In this case, the agent offering the lower price 
would clear and serve the entire load, while the other would not. 
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 Figure 1. Q-Agent and $10 Static Offer Opponent, 1,000 MW Load 
 
The adaptive agent’s profit function is piecewise linear, increasing from an offer of $0 
($0 profit) to $9.99 ($9,999 profit) and dropping to $0 profit at offers higher than $10,000 (tie-
breaking was 50/50 random, so at $10 exactly, expected profit was $5,000). The results are 
shown in Figure 1; the non-linear series is the adaptive agent’s offer series (moving average to 
address noise during the simulation).  The agent learned relatively quickly to just underbid the 
static price agent. 
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 Figure 2. Q-Agent and $10 Static Offer Opponent, 1,400 MW Load 
 
Figure 2 shows the second scenario in which load is raised to 1,400 MW; the other 
parameters are unchanged.  While both agents will necessarily clear and the uniform clearing 
price will be set to the higher offer, the agent that sets price will clear only 400 MW.  Therefore, 
the choice for the adaptive agent is really between offering at the price cap and receiving a profit 
of $8,000 ($20 * 400 MW) versus offering below $10 and clearing its full capacity, for a profit 
of $10,000.  As the figure shows, the agent quickly learned to make the second choice. 
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 Figure 3. Q-Agent and $10 Static Offer Opponent, 1,600 MW Load 
 
Figure 3 shows the third scenario, in which load is raised to 1,600 MW.  In this case, the 
optimal behavior is to bid at the price cap of $20 (profit = $12,000) rather than bidding low 
(profit = $10,000).  The agent successfully learned this.  The results showed the promise of an 
adaptive agent using a Q-Learning algorithm in a stationary scenario with a uniform clearing 
price market structure similar to real-world electric power markets. 
3.3. Current Market Model Description 
The new version of the market model used in this research is significantly more complex 
than that used in Miksis, 2006.  It is built with the same fundamental design as the real-time 
scheduling, pricing and dispatch (SPD) algorithms used by power system operators to manage 
least-cost dispatch of electric power generating stations and other assets; it is similarly comprised 
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of a transmission system, loads and generating assets, with physical and economic parameters.  
At a basic level, power transmission systems are composed of nodes and lines, each of which 
connect two or more nodes (infrequently more than two), while assets are located at nodes on the 
grid.  In reality, most power systems are made up of hundreds or thousands of nodes, lines, 
generators and other assets.  The model used in the simulations described later is a much-
simplified representation of an actual power system, including only 5 nodes, 6 lines and 25 
generators (5 agents controlling 5 generators each). Figure 4 shows the system used in this 
research project. 
As described above, power systems are extremely fragile machines.  In order to maintain 
reliable delivery of power, system operators must perform least-cost dispatch optimization while 
respecting many physical constraints: Generators must be dispatched at or below their maximum 
capacity (and occasionally there are nonlinearities imposed by the binary on/off decisions with a 
unit operating at zero, at a minimum output, somewhere above minimum, or at maximum), 
power lines must not transfer electricity in excess of their thermal limits and load at every node 
on the system must be matched with supply (Kirchhoff’s current law declares that nodal balance 
is respected: the sum of injections, line inflows, line outflows and withdrawals equals zero).  
Because electric power flows through a network according to physical laws, and for the most 
part cannot be directed from point to point along a particular path, these laws must be translated 
into constraints in the dispatch model, so that power injections and withdrawals at each node are 
made to ensure power flows respect all thermal transmission line limits.  A key point is that in a 
transmission network a unit of power (MW) injected at one point, conventionally called a source, 
and withdrawn at another, called a sink, will flow partially along every possible path between the 
two locations; how much energy flows along each path is determined by the line resistance (in 
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the case of direct-current, or DC, models) or impedance (in the case of alternating-current, or 
AC, models)17.  To aid in the dispatch of the system, these line resistances for a given network 
are used to pre-calculate factors, known as power transfer distribution factors (“PTDFs”), for 
each triplet (source node/power line/sink node) to determine how much (0 to 1, or 0% to 100%) 
of a MW injected at the source and withdrawn at the sink flows along the line. 
A further simplifying process decomposes this factor into two others, called generator 
shift factors (or sometimes just shift factors), representing first, the PTDF from the sink to a 
chosen reference node and second the PTDF from reference node to the sink (the chosen 
reference node uniquely determines every GSF, but does not change the resulting power flows or 
prices). This is done to simplify the calculation of power flows when modeling line constraints.18 
While real-world power systems must be dispatched respecting hundreds or thousands of 
constraints (including not only thermal line limits, but also generator capacity constraints, 
upward and downward ramp limitations, post-contingency reliability line transfer limits19, 
stability/voltage limits and more), the model used in this research contains only 25 generator 
capacity constraints and 12 thermal line limit constraints (lines are bi-directional, so a constraint 
must impose lower and upper bound flows), plus the energy balance equality constraint. 
                                                 
17 The market model used in this research is, for practical reasons, built upon a DC system. 
18 A GSF for a node-line pair allows the linear program to respect line constraints using a single GSF coefficient on 
each decision variable; because of the system energy balance equality constraint, the dispatch will ensure that each 
MW injected and “sent” to the reference node is matched by an offsetting MW “sent” from the reference node to the 
sink/withdrawal node. 
19 We have already described the fragility of power systems.  Because power flows adjust almost instantaneously in 
response to changes in the system, if a line “trips” out of service, the power that previously flowed on that line is 
directed along other paths.  This can overload these lines, which can lead to cascading failure as protection systems 
will automatically trip lines that are overloaded to avoid permanent equipment damage.  Consequently, power flow 
on lines are limited not to their actual thermal limit rating, but to the level at which the lines that would pick up their 
flows could carry if the line in question did trip.  For this reason, in industry parlance, line constraints are sometimes 
referred to as “line x onto line y”. 
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The simulations performed as part of this research are repeated single-round runs of the 
market model, which means that inter-temporal ramp constraints are not needed.  Additionally, 
the dispatch levels of generators are lower-bounded at zero, so that the non-linear binary 
commitment decision is not a part of the model.  With these restrictions, the problem is linear, 
and as such, is easy and quick to solve with off-the-shelf linear programming packages. 
3.3.1. The Power System Model 
Having described the general components of a simplified power system model, we next 
introduce the model used in this research: first, the physical system, then the market mechanics 
(3.3.2 and 3.3.3) and lastly, the agents (3.3.4).  As mentioned, there are 5 nodes in the system 
model, with 6 lines connecting them in a network (the nodes are circles and the transmission 
lines are squares): 
 
Figure 4. Modeled Power System Diagram 
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The resistances used for the lines were borrowed from a public system model used in 
training tools by the ISO New England Inc. and PJM regional transmission organizations.20 
Table 2 in Appendix B shows the relevant data and the generator shift factors derived from the 
resistances.  The data in the table are not significant unless understood in context.  What they 
mean, for example, is that a MW injected at Node 3 and withdrawn at the reference flows 
through the network as shown in Figure 5 (reading down the 3?2 column, we see that 16% 
flows in the direction from Node 3 to Node 4 along Line 5; because of nodal balance at Node 4, 
this 16% continues along Line 2 to Node 0, etc.; lines are directional only for the purpose of 
calculating power flows). 
 
Figure 5. Line Flow Demonstration with Node 3 Injection 
 
Because GSFs are additive, to calculate flows on Line 5 caused by an injection at Node 3 
and a withdrawal at Node 4, we add 16% (GSFNode3,Line5) to 32% (-1 * -32% =  -1 * -
GSFNode4,Line5, because we are withdrawing instead of injecting at node 4).  This equals the PTDF 
                                                 
20 See http://www.iso-ne.com/support/training/5bus/index.html. 
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on Line 5 from an injection at Node 3 and a withdrawal at Node 4.  It is then clear that, although 
GSFs are uniquely determined by the choice of the reference node, the choice is arbitrary for 
purposes of calculating power flows and prices.21 
Now that we have an understanding of the mechanics of the 5-node model used in the 
simulations, we will discuss the three other components of the complete market model, the least-
cost dispatch, pricing and congestion, and the agents. 
3.3.2. Least-Cost Dispatch 
The problem of minimizing total dispatch cost is linear.  Each decision variable 
corresponds to output of a generator, while the cost coefficient of each variable is the price offer 
of that unit (used for brevity synonymously with generator; more on this in the “Agents” section, 
3.3.4.).  The objective function is therefore: 
papa
pa
xc ,,
,  
∑  a ∈  A (set of agents; 0 to 4); p ∈  P (set of plants; 0 to 4) (i) 
The most important constraint in all power systems is the energy balance equality 
constraint (supply MUST equal demand at all times).  Therefore, the first constraint is: 
∑∑ =
n
npa
pa
nodalLoadx ,
,  
       (ii) 
As c , nodalLoad is also an input to the optimization, determining as implied, the load 
(electric power demand) at each of the 5 nodes n. The next set of constraints ensure that the 
output of each unit (a,p) is not greater than its capacity capacitya,p. 
papa capacityx ,, ≤  ∀  a ∈  A, p ∈  P      (iii) 
                                                 
21 This is not strictly true in AC systems, where losses are modeled.  Litvinov et al, 2004 discuss the choice and 
consequence of reference nodes. 
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Finally, there are the line limits (maximum flow in either direction, modelled as positive 
and negative flows in the convention used above), which are similarly inputs to the simulation. 
The variable nr is used to denote a non-reference node ∈  (0,1,3,4), as we omit the reference 
node from line flow calculations.  The matrix GSF is shown in Table 2 (Appendix B). 
line
nr
nrnrline lineLimitNIGSF ≤∑ ,  ∀ line ∈  L (set of lines; 0 to 5)  (iv) 
line
nr
nrnrline lineLimitNIGSF −≥∑ , ∀ line ∈  L     (v) 
NInr is the net injection (possibly negative, in which case it’s a net withdrawal) at the non-
reference node nr. 
NInr = ∑ nr ∈  (0,1,3,4)    (vi) −
pa
nrnrpapa nodalLoadnx
,
,,, ∀
where na,p,nr  = 1 if plant p of agent a is located at node nr   (vii) 
  = 0 otherwise 
The last set of constraints is that which ensures non-negativity; although in real-world 
power systems there are assets that can become net consumers (pump storage hydroelectric 
facilities and flywheels are two examples), the units in our model are assumed to be traditional 
thermal power plants, dispatchable from zero to capacity: 
0, ≥pax ∀  a ∈  A, p ∈  P       (viii) 
Altogether, (i) through (viii) comprise the least-cost dispatch algorithm. 
3.3.3. Pricing and Congestion 
In most modern power systems, prices are determined nodally (so-called locational 
marginal pricing, or LMP).  The term “locational” indicates that prices differ across the power 
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system, while marginal indicates that the system uses uniform pricing22; the price at any location 
is exactly equal to the marginal change in the objective function caused by an incremental MW 
delivered there (net withdrawal off of the system).23 
In a DC model without losses, the normal case where no transmission line constraints are 
binding has the marginal cost to deliver an additional MW anywhere on the grid equal to the 
shadow price of the energy balance equation, which is always binding (it is often denoted λ).  
Intuitively, this will be equal to the cost coefficient of the unit providing the last increment of 
energy (in the case of no binding transmission constraints), equivalently the most expensive unit 
online; this unit is known in the industry as the marginal unit. 
In cases where one or more transmission lines are binding, there will be more than one 
marginal unit.  It is a truism that, except in the degenerate case of identically-priced and 
identically-located units, there will always be one greater number of marginal units than the 
number of binding transmission constraints.  The shadow prices of binding transmission 
constraints are traditionally labelled μ.  The formula for calculating LMPs is: 
LMPnr = λ + ∑ nr ∈  (0,1,3,4)     (ix) 
k
nrkkGSF ,μ ∀
where GSFk,nr is the generator shift factor corresponding to the line whose upper or lower 
limit is binding and non-reference node nr.  For the reference node, the LMP is always equal to λ 
(or “system λ”), the marginal cost to deliver an additional MW to the reference node (there is no 
congestion component of LMP at the reference). 
                                                 
22 Xiong, Okuma and Fujita, 2004 have addressed a comparison between pay-as-bid and uniform pricing in their 
multi-agent simulation research.  Kahn, et al, 2001 provides an excellent overview of the comparison. 
23 It will be noted that revenues collected by generators will not equal the objective function.  The objective of least-
cost dispatch is not to minimize the total electricity bill paid by consumers, but to minimize production costs. 
 43
Two interesting phenomena worth noting are observed with locational marginal pricing.  
First is that, in cases of transmission congestion, the system λ will not equal the marginal cost of 
a single marginal unit, but will be a function of the costs of all marginal units (determined by 
system topology, and equivalently shift factors).  Secondly, occasionally the LMP at a location 
will be higher than the highest price offer submitted by any unit24. 
3.3.4. Agents 
Agents are arguably the most important component of this market model.  Conceptually, 
an agent is an autonomous software agent with an interface for interacting with the outside 
world, in this case the modelled power system and market clearing mechanism.  In our context, 
each agent represents a power generating company with a portfolio of 5 plants.  The agent 
interacts with the market in two ways: by taking action and by receiving reward.  It would be a 
stretch to assign volition or awareness to the agents in our context, but through the action-
selection mechanism and the value-function-update mechanism, the agents, over iterations of the 
market, are designed to behave in ways that increase their profits. 
Each agent controls 5 plants, each situated (possibly independently of each other) at one 
of the 5 nodes.  The default capacity of every plant is 500 MW, while the costs of the plants, in 
increasing cost order are $0, $40, $80, $150 and $600/MW, respectively.  These parameters 
(location, capacity and cost) are modifiable by the modeller at the beginning of each simulation; 
a simulation is set of a predetermined number of rounds). 
                                                 
24 This is well-known in the power industry and results from the fact that the possibility exists that maintaining nodal 
balance when delivering an additional MW to a particular node will require adjusting dispatch elsewhere on the grid 
such that cheap generation in several locations must be replaced with more expensive generation; as the locational 
marginal price equals the change to the total objective function, this incremental energy can be very expensive when 
several MW (or more) of expensive generation displace cheap generation) 
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Agents have a set of 32 actions, consisting of all combinations of their 5 plants either in-
service or out-of-service (25).  In contrast to most ABM research, the agents here are competing 
on quantity rather than price.  The price-offer for each unit is fixed and equal to the marginal cost 
(for purposes of calculating profit; if a $600 unit clears and the LMP at the node is $600, the 
profit it $0).  Because determining quantity offered is the decision of each agent, it is therefore 
possible that the agents collectively may offer insufficient capacity to meet load, or offer their 
portfolios in a way that forces an infeasible solution with respect to the thermal line limit 
constraints.  When this happens, proxy generators clear to supply energy at an arbitrarily high 
price so that the market solves (the feasible region is never empty), while the agents receive $0 
profits for the round.25 
3.3.4.1. Agent Value Set 
The value function, in the fashion of Q-Learning, is Q(a): A → R. Q(a) holds a scalar 
value for each action, which in the limit will approach the expected value of that action26, where 
convergence occurs.  In our model, Q(a) for every a is set to a high initial positive value, to 
encourage exploration (this implies an optimistic estimate of expected values for actions, by 
which agents are purposefully “disappointed” with actions they try and will continue to take 
actions they haven’t tried until overall values fall into line with experience). 
                                                 
25 Strictly speaking, the LP described in the preceding section omits this proxy-unit feature.  This discrepancy is 
analogous to real-world system operations, in which an infeasible dispatch solution will be disregarded by system 
operators, and the dispatch will be rerun with new inputs (as in Eastern RTOs), or the violating constraint will be 
relaxed with a penalty (as in California). 
26 As mentioned previously, Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis 1996 and Sutton and Barto, 1998 have shown that an action’s 
value in a stationary task will converge in the limit to the true expected value to the agent of taking that action. 
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In the reinforcement learning literature, there are two basic ways in which agents use 
their action-values to select actions: soft-max or epsilon-greedy27.  In the first case, soft-max, the 
agent selects one combination of their portfolio of plants in or out of service (each combination 
corresponding to one of their 32 actions) by sampling from an action-probability distribution, 
derived from their action-values.  The probability of selecting any action a is: 
P(a) = ∑
=
32
1
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e
e
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 where τ is a so-called “temperature” parameter (used in reinforcement learning).  
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Obviously, regardless of τ, the probabilities sum to 1.  In reinforcement learning 
applications, in order for the theoretical optimality to be achieved, τ is adjusted downward by a 
scaling factor less than 1 throughout the simulation to gradually shift action selection from 
exploration (high τ implies a flatter action-probability distribution) to exploitation (a low τ 
implies a peakier distribution).28 
The second way agents may pick actions is the epsilon-greedy method:  Simpler than 
soft-max, agents select their highest-valued action with probability 0.9 and sample from a 
uniform distribution of their actions with probability 0.1.  The method used here is epsilon-
greedy.  In addition to requiring less computation, performance was better (agents discovered 
more profitable stable equilibria more often) with epsilon-greedy. 
                                                 
27 The method used in Somani and Tesfatsion, 2008, is a special case of soft-max, with τ = 1. 
28 In the stationary task case, according to Sutton and Barto 1998, optimality is guaranteed when certain criteria are 
met, one of which is that the temperature must be reduced properly to ensure that the optimal action is always 
chosen when the Q-function asymptotically approaches the true expected values of the actions. 
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Because the joint reward function is deterministic, the task resembles a matrix game, 
though the number of possible combinations of the five agents’ actions exceeds 33.5 million ( = 
325).  After the market clears, the agents are returned the cleared results of their portfolio, which 
plants cleared and what prices were paid.  The agents then calculate their reward as a function of 
the total profit (a scalar multiplier in our case profit / 1000000; this has no practical impact 
except to avoid a chance of a computational error when the soft-max action-selection method 
was used with very small τ; we initially tried this, but eventually went with epsilon-greedy).  
Having just taken action a, and calculated a reward r from their profit, the individual agent’s 
update algorithm is: 
raQaQ αα +−← )()1()(         (ix) 
This update algorithm has been widely used in agent-based models of electricity markets, 
since it was popularized by Erev and Roth (1998), in their comparison of reinforcement learners 
with human learners in experimental games.  As agent-based models incorporate additional 
features that have the effect of complicating the models and facing modelers with the potential 
for non-convergence, other reinforcement learning algorithms (such as Abdallah and Lesser’s 
weighted-policy learning) should be explored, as convergence of a community of agents to one 
or several Nash-Equilibria has been demonstrated in certain contexts when convergence has 
failed with the Q-learning update algorithm above. 
3.4. Implementing the Model in Java 
The model described above was implemented as a stand-alone Java application built 
within the Eclipse Integrated Development Environment (IDE)29.  In addition to standard Java 
                                                 
29 See http://www.eclipse.org/ for more information. 
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packages, we also used an open-source mathematical programming package (LP Solve) for 
optimization.30  The graphical user interface (GUI) is shown in Figure Figure 6. 
                                                
The application has two primary functions.  First, “Run Scenario Round” allows the 
modeler to clear a single round of the market with manual inputs (setting not only the overall 
parameters: loads, line limits, unit capacities, unit locations and marginal costs, but also agents’ 
bids).  This feature is useful for constructing scenarios in preparation for a simulation run. 
The second feature is to run a simulation using inputs.  In this case, all the parameters 
except the “Agent Offer Schedules” are used in the simulation (the agent offers are determined 
by the agents, as described above; changing these values in the interface does not alter the ability 
of each agent to offer their full portfolio). 
In the present model version, the system topology and the numbers of agents and units 
(also called plants or generators), are hard-coded.  Adding the flexibility of inputting these 
parameters was considered but was discarded because the marginal benefit to the research 
project was deemed less than the added cost of changing the model.  Future steps in this line of 
research could include adding this feature.  In fact, to make this research more applicable to real-
world power systems, expanding the number of nodes, lines and agents will be critical.  A key 
component will be to incorporate dynamic calculation of shift factors from an easy system-
topology GUI design tool. 
During simulation runs, data are saved to csv files in the default working directory (the 
target working directory can be changed through editing the Java code).  Analysis was performed 
with the help of a second open-source program called R.31 
 
30 LP Solve was chosen because it is an established package of optimization tools with encouraging performance 
(many 100,000s of rounds are practical on a standard laptop or desktop personal computer).  For more information, 
see http://lpsolve.sourceforge.net/5.5/. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPLORING THE MODEL 
Early research results presented in Miksis, 2006, showed that adaptive agents in a 
stationary electric power market model task successfully discovered optimal behavior.  The 
challenges to achieving convergence in a more complex and multi-agent reinforcement learning 
application are significant, and as others have shown, convergence is not guaranteed, even in 
relatively simple matrix games (Abdallah and Lesser, 2008). 
Although many of the most interesting aspects of the market model are seen through the 
simulation feature, the single round mode of the model supports intuition development as well as 
sensitivity analysis after simulation results are gathered.   
Figure 6 shows the market model interface that is used for both modes.  There are 8 
windows for simulation inputs and one control panel. Clockwise from top left are: 1) the control 
panel, 2) the offer schedules for each of the 25 power plants (used only for the single-round 
mode), 3) the node locations of each of the 25 plants, 4) the thermal limits on each of the 6 
transmission lines, 5) the nodal (demand) loads, 6) the marginal costs for each of the 25 plants, 
7) the capacities of each plant (defaulted to 500) and finally, 8) inputs controlling the simulation. 
The simulation inputs are the number of rounds to run, the learning rate for the agents, 
and the frequency with which the model should output market results to the set of csv files and 
the frequency with which information should be printed to the Java console (helpful for 
debugging).  Using the single-round mode, it is possible to develop an intuitive understanding of 
how the model clears the market.
 
31 See http://www.r-project.org/. 
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Figure 6. Market Model Interface
 
 CHAPTER 5 
USING THE MODEL 
As described in the introduction, this research was motivated by 3 fundamental questions: 
1. Can a community of adaptive agents competing in a quantity-based market 
model achieve equilibrium under various initial conditions? 
2. Can players with plants at multiple locations (on either side of a transmission 
constraint) discover withholding policies that cause congestion, essentially 
raising prices at the import-constrained node? 
3. Does the market as a whole supply surplus capacity above load or is the 
average excess capacity margin in equilibrium close to zero? 
In order to answer these questions, we first developed a set of 3 scenarios with various 
distributions of plants across the system and recorded how the market cleared an “all-in” 
situation, in which no units are withheld.  For each scenario, we then ran several simulations 
with the agents competing and learning.  These scenarios well-represent two issues of concern in 
modern competitive power systems: The exercise of system and local market power. The first 
issue relates to firms’ ability to unilaterally or collectively withhold some capacity such that 
prices are maintained above a level consistent with a competitive market. Several system 
operators in the U.S. implement market power tests at the system level which allows mitigation 
actions to be taken if one or a group of firms are pivotal (demand cannot be met without at least 
some of their energy). 
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 The second issue, local market power, is the ability to affect prices in a local area caused 
by network transmission constraints. System operators also have mechanisms in place to test for 
and mitigate market power exercised at the local level. The agents in our model are motivated to 
find profit-maximizing strategies by any means possible. We demonstrate that when highest 
profits are achieved by withholding capacity and raising the system clearing price to$600, the 
agents converge to this point. In the case where the most profitable joint-strategy is to 
strategically withhold particular units at particular locations to take advantage of network 
constraints, the agents successfully find this as well.  In order for agents to converge to a joint-
strategy that takes advantage of network constraints, they must have both the means to cause 
congestion and the incentive to benefit from this action.  If either element is missing, strategic 
congestion will not result. Scenario 1 has both elements, and so we see higher prices result.  
Scenarios 2 and 3 are structured such that overall capacity is withheld to raise system price, but 
there is no congestion. 
The data appendix contains market clearing output for all of these scenarios in both the 
all-bid-in case and the strategic competition case.  Scenarios are generically defined by thermal 
line limits, nodal loads, plant capacities, plant marginal costs and plant-to-node assignments.  All 
scenarios use the line thermal limits and nodal loads as shown in Table 3, as well as the default 
capacity and marginal costs parameters described earlier.  
These values were chosen to represent a power grid with defined import-constrained and 
export-constrained regions: Those with higher nodal demands represent load centers, such as 
large metropolitan areas (Boston is a good example in the New England power system), which 
generally also have higher generation costs and limited import capability, relative to demand; 
Those nodes with lower loads represent more rural regions where generation costs are lower and 
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 the limitation is transmission capacity sufficient to export the energy that can potentially be 
generated at that node (Maine in the New England power system is an example). 
 
Figure 7. System Diagram Showing Line Limits and Loads 
 
The scenarios explored below differ in the distribution of plants to nodes.  While the 
potential avenues of experimentation with the model developed here are numerous, only a subset 
was chosen for practical reasons.  These were chosen for their ability to showcase strategic 
behavior. 
5.1. Scenario 1 
In the first scenario, the plants are distributed such that each agent has one plant at each 
node, and the most expensive units are located in the higher-load areas.  All agents have identical 
distributions of their plants among the nodes, with all $600/MW plants at Node 0, $150/MW 
plants at Node 1, etc.  Appendix B Table 4 to Table 7 show market-cleared results in the case 
when all units are bid in (no units are out of service).  The baseline least-cost dispatch in this 
case has congestion, because Line 3 (Node 1 to Node 2) is congested.  Consequently, as the data 
tables show, Agent 0’s Plant 1 is marginal and partially dispatched at the reference node at $80, 
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 while Agent 3’s Plant 3 is marginal and partially dispatched at Node 1 at $150.  Prices at the 
other nodes are determined as explained above, by the system energy component ($80 = 
marginal generation unit cost at the reference node, Node 2) + shift factors * the shadow price on 
the binding transmission line (Line 3). 
Scenario 1 was then simulated with the agents competing to meet load. This scenario 
attempts to answer Questions 1 and 2, whether equilibrium is reached, and whether agents 
strategically bid to take advantage of transmission constraints. Simulations show that the agents 
successfully achieve one of 20 (symmetrical) equilibrium joint policies in Scenario 1, involving a 
permutation of the offer schedules shown in Table 8.  
Because the agent’s plant distributions are identical, any of the permutations are equally 
likely (which permutation is achieved depends on the randomly-determined path of experiences 
and learning of the agents).  As the table shows, only 4 of the 25 units are withheld, but profits 
are substantial.  Figure 8 shows time series of a single 100,000 round simulation (the series 
represent averages of 100 rounds, so as to eliminate noise), in which rounds 45,000 and higher 
showcase the equilibrium profit-maximizing case shown in Table 8. 
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Figure 8. Scenario 1, Nodal LMPs for a Single Simulation Run  
 
In the all-in market run, the highest LMP is $150.00 at Node 1, one of the two nodes with 
relatively high load, and relatively expensive generation. Table 10 shows the prices resulting 
from [any permutation of] the offer schedule shown above in Table 8.32 
The highest nodal price is at the reference node (note that marginal congestion 
components can be negative, even though congestion itself always increases total costs), at 
$1,955.79.  A detailed derivation of this phenomenon is explained in Appendix A. 
                                                 
32 Table 9 to Table 12 show market output data for the one of the symmetrical permutations of 
the agents’ equilibrium joint strategies. 
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 The agents converge to a permutation of this equilibrium joint strategy because it is the 
strategy that maximizes total agent profit and it is a Nash-Equilibrium.  No agent can unilaterally 
increase its profits by deviating (while three agents are making less profit than the best-off and 
second-best-off agents, they make even less if they break the stable joint strategy; which agents 
end up in which role is random).  It should be noted that convergence was not achieved within 
100,000 rounds in every simulation. 
Figure 9 shows price results from 3 simulation runs of the model with the parameter set 
we have called “Scenario 1”. Clearly, after about 15,000 to 20,000 rounds, the agent’s have 
begun to assign significantly different values to their actions, demonstrated by the reduction in 
noise in the prices.  It is clear that there are generally two regimes the agents converge to, and a 
regime switch occurs at some point in each simulation. 
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Figure 9. Scenario 1, Load-Weighted System LMP for Three Simulation Runs 
 
It is notable that convergence occurs at different points in the simulation in each run.  In 
some other runs of the model (not shown), we observed that convergence did not occur at all in 
100,000 rounds.  This indicates that there may be a non-zero probably of regime switching to the 
higher pricing and profit state never occurring. 
By looking at the bid behavior over time, we can gain insights as well into whether the 
agents tend to offer capacity close to load levels (excess capacity ~= 0), near full capacity 
(12,500) or somewhere in between. We see in Figure 10 that dynamic adjustments in market 
supply occur throughout the simulation, even while overall prices remain high.  The series shows 
both average aggregate supply over all rounds and only those which cleared competitively.  This 
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 highlights how, after the initial learning phase, the agents proceed to rarely bid such that the 
market doesn’t clear (the case when a proxy generator is dispatched and revenues are $0 for all 
agents).  Note that the chance of submitting a random offer (as opposed to the action with the 
highest expected value) remains 10%, and so the “Approved Rounds” series of aggregate MW 
supply offers is below 10,500 (the result of optimal behavior, with 4 units out of service of 500 
MW each. 
 
 
Figure 10. Scenario 1, Aggregate Supply Offered 
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  Figure 11 shows the individual agents’ profits over time, demonstrating that even after 
overall high prices have been achieved there remains some jostling among the agents for their 
piece of the profits. 
 
Figure 11. Scenario 1, Individual Agents’ Profits over the Simulation Run 
 
5.2. Scenario 2 
In the next scenario we explored distributed the agents’ plants non-identically among the 
nodes, in which all of each agent’s plants were at a single node (Agent 0 at Node 0, etc.).  The 
results of the single-round all-bid-in market clearing are shown in Table 13 to Table 16.  In this 
scenario, the all-bid-in least-cost dispatch does not have any congestion, and prices at all nodes 
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 are equal to the energy component (also shadow price of the energy balance equation, or the 
marginal price of the marginal unit) of $150. Figure 12 shows the nodal prices over the 
simulation run of Scenario 2.  The competitive equilibrium market results can be found in the 
appendix (Appendix B, Table 17 to Table 21). 
 
Figure 12. Scenario 2, Nodal LMPs for a Single Simulation Run 
 
We do not see the same pattern of congestion causing price separation in the equilibrium 
solution for Scenario 2.  However, due to selective withholding, the agents do maintain a price 
point at $600/MW, compared with $150/MW in the all-bid-in case. Figure 13, below, shows 
aggregate supply, graphed with total load and system capacity.  We see that, in answer to 
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 Question 3, the agents withhold enough capacity to hold prices above the baseline least-cost all-
bid-in case. 
 
Figure 13. Scenario 2, Aggregate Supply Offered 
 
5.3. Scenario 3 
The third scenario we examined was the inverse of Scenario 1.  In this case, each agent 
had a single plant at each node, except the distributions were in the reverse order ($600/MW at 
Node 4, $150/MW at Node 3, etc.).  The key result here was that, while all-bid-in least-cost 
dispatch resulted in congestion, the equilibrium competitive solution did not (See Table 22 and 
Table 27).  As in Scenario 2, the agents successfully withheld capacity to maintain an average 
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 system price of $600/MW, but this was not more profitable than a solution involving 
strategically-caused congestion. 
 
Figure 14. Scenario 3, Nodal LMPs for a Single Simulation Run 
Similarly to the simulation run of Scenarios 1 and 2, we see a switch in aggregate supply 
offered somewhere between rounds 85,000 and 90,000, though prices do not change. 
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Figure 15. Scenario 3, Aggregate Supply Offered  
 
5.4. Using The Model – Conclusion 
In all 3 of the scenarios we ran, the 5 agents established baseline price outcomes 
significantly higher than the “all-bid-in” competitive solution.  In one scenario, the agents 
utilized the system topology and distribution of generating units among the nodes to maintain a 
load-weighted system average price significantly above even the highest price offer: Absent the 
continued exploration caused by the epsilon value, which caused deviations from the learned 
greedy behavior, every round after learning converged in Scenario 1 would have had prices as 
shown in Table 10 (a weighted system price of $974.49, 62% higher than the highest unit costs). 
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 CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND WHAT’S NEXT 
In the last two decades, many examples of agent-based models of competitive electric 
power markets have been developed, varying along several dimensions, including sophistication 
of the agents, complexity of the underlying transmission system and incorporation of features 
unique to modern electric power systems.  As with many new ventures in a young field, there 
remain significant trade-offs that must be made, explicitly or not, between complexity/realism 
and practicability.  Simple agents in a complex environment may not behave as agents in an 
analogous real-world situation would, which can lead to results that, while interesting, do not 
carry the gravity of results with optimality proofs, or those with strong evidence of convergence 
to equilibria that can be favorably benchmarked against real-world phenomena.  This carries the 
risk that interesting conclusions are not as compelling as they could be. On the other hand, 
sophisticated agents with learning capabilities may not fully learn a task with multiple 
dimensions in terms of interacting products (gas and electricity, electricity and ancillary services, 
etc.), overlapping and nested time periods (multi-year contracting, day-ahead and spot 
balancing), or a large number of assets with granular action sets, in which case convergence may 
not occur. 
Several researchers in the field have commented that agent-based models suffer from 
insufficient robustness necessary for the ABM approach to gain wider acceptance, particularly 
among economists and regulators.  Part of the motivation for this research was to incrementally 
build a model with enough realism to demonstrate phenomena that are in fact of great concern to 
stakeholders in the electric power industry (market power in transmission systems with 
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 congestion).  We have succeeded in doing this, demonstrating, although without rigorous parallel 
analytical solutions (like Waltman and Kaymak, 2008, have), that profit-seeking agents both 1) 
quickly find and favor feasible solutions and 2) often converge in a relatively small number of 
rounds to profit-maximizing equilibria. In all 3 of the scenarios we ran, the 5 agents established 
baseline price outcomes significantly higher than the “all-bid-in” competitive solution.  In one 
scenario, the agents utilized the system topology and distribution of generating units among the 
nodes to maintain a load-weighted system average price significantly above even the highest 
price offer (a load-weighted system price of $974.49, 62% higher than the most expensive units’ 
costs). 
In the work presented in this thesis, we have attempted to answer the three questions 
posed in the introduction: 
1. Can a community of adaptive agents competing in a quantity-based market model 
achieve equilibrium under various initial conditions? 
2. Can players with plants at multiple locations (on either side of a transmission 
constraint) discover withholding policies that cause congestion, essentially raising 
prices at the import-constrained node? 
3. Does the market as a whole supply surplus capacity above load or is the average 
excess capacity margin in equilibrium close to zero? 
We can answer the first two affirmatively, under the conditions presented in each of the 
scenarios (with the caveat that the 2nd and 3rd scenarios did not have the underlying generating 
plant distribution among the nodes in which an equilibrium solution with congestion was the 
most profitable outcome).  The third question is actually not very significant in the scenarios 
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 presented in this work, as the agents clearly had little incentive to withhold capacity down to the 
level of load once the system energy price reached the maximum attainable in the uncongested 
case.  For the congested case, clearly aggregate supply is not the deciding factor in profitability, 
but it is the interplay between localized capacity and transmission constraints. 
Future steps in this line of research must include consideration of how to incorporate 
environments with increased complexity while appreciating the limitations of learning agents.  
Additional surveys of contemporary multi-agent reinforcement learning literature may lead 
toward insights on how to move beyond the limitations presently identified of more complexity 
and less tractability vs. less complexity and more tractability.  Neural networks and other general 
function approximation techniques may support sufficient learning speeds in high-dimensional 
tasks where generalization is necessary. 
Immediate steps to proceed from the current state of the research presented here will 
include enhancing the model to support dynamic system topology creation through a GUI or 
input files in order to explore more realistic transmission congestion scenarios, and more robust 
experimentation to explore the distribution of rounds-to-convergence among larger numbers of 
identical scenario runs with different pseudo-random number seeds.  Introducing demand-side 
bidding and a multi-settlement system may be possible to the extent that the costs in terms of 
added joint-action space are made explicit and convergence remains achievable; here more than 
anywhere else, what we don’t yet know of contemporary multi-agent systems research may be a 
silver bullet of sorts in surmounting the trade-off highlighted above. 
The potential for research in the direction begun in this thesis is both academically 
engaging and practical for applications to real-world concerns. Flexible, scalable, customizable 
models of market interactions support ultimate what-if scenario analysis. Combined with an 
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underlying transmission model and generation portfolio with sufficient realism, the models have 
the potential to be run parallel to transmission planning studies, structural market power 
estimates, and market rule-making to stress-test scenarios before real-world implementation.  
Regulators and other stakeholders have repeatedly expressed concern about the potential exercise 
of market power in competitive electricity markets, particularly in regions where transmission 
bottlenecks are prone to creating extreme market power where there are only a few independent 
suppliers available to meet demand in extreme circumstances. However, rules written to test for, 
catch and punish anticompetitive behavior, such as strategic withholding, are complex and 
imperfect. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has determined to ensure just and 
reasonable electric rates through design and implementation of competitive generation markets 
and open-access transmission systems coupled with careful regulations tailored to the uniqueness 
of electric power markets. Using all available research tools to examine market outcomes where 
agents seek to exploit profitable market weaknesses without regard to regulatory repercussions 
can offer an added layer of protection to market monitoring and mitigation procedures of system 
operators, particularly in light of the complex pricing effects strategic behavior can have on an 
interconnected power grid. 
 
 APPENDIX A 
EXPOSITION OF NODAL PRICES 
 
Figure 16. Scenario 1 Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Power Line Flows % of Capacity 
 
1. Line 4, running from Node 2 to Node 3, is congested in the direction of the 
reference Node (2).  Consequently, in order to deliver a single MW to Node 2, we 
need to find a combination of redispatches that will not increase flow on this line. 
2. Note that the GSF of every non-reference node to Line 4 is negative, meaning 
unilaterally increasing generation anywhere will exacerbate the problem (violate 
the constraint). 
Table 1. Generator Shift Factors (Nodes in Rows, Lines in Columns) 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 0.54 0.25 0.21 0.54 -0.46 -0.21 
1 -0.13 0.07 0.06 0.87 -0.13 -0.06 
3 0.35 -0.19 -0.16 0.35 -0.65 0.16 
4 0.51 0.17 -0.68 0.51 -0.49 -0.32 
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 3. To solve this problem, we need to increase generation by a net of 1 MW at two 
nodes by increasing output at one of them by 1 more than we decrease output at 
another.33  However, there is another limitation.  The node at which we increase 
generation must have a smaller (absolute) shift factor with Line 4 than the one 
where we decrease generation. 
4. The candidates for increasing generation are a plant at Node 3 or a plant at Node 0 
(notice that those plants in service at the other nodes have all been dispatched to 
their maximum capacity). 
5. Because the GSF for Node 0 and Line 4 (-0.46) is absolutely smaller than the GSF 
for Node 3 and Line 4 (-0.65), we will increase output at Node 0 and decrease it at 
Node 4. 
6. Consider that meeting the incremental MW at Node 2 from Node 0 will cause 
Line 4 to go 0.46 MW over its limit. Therefore, we need to further increase output 
at Node 1 and balance it will a decrease in output at Node 3.  But by how much? 
7. The effect of replacing a single MW at Node 3 with one from Node 0 has the net 
effect of decreasing flow in the offending direction on Line 4 by 0.19 MW (-0.46 
- -0.65 = 0.19). 
                                                 
33 PowerWorld is a software package that is extremely useful for generating intuition of power flows. See 
http://www.powerworld.com/ for more information. 
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8. Additionally, the marginal change in the objective function of this single MW 
substitution is $560 ($600 cost at Node 0 - $40 saved at Node 3).  Therefore, we 
need to incur $560 / 0.19 to decrease flow on Line 4 by a full 1 MW. 
9. However, we don’t need a full MW, we only need 0.46 MW.  0.46 * $560 / 0.19 
= $1355.79.  This equals the price difference between the source of that 
incremental MW (Node 0) and the reference node (Node 2)!34 
 
34 It is important to remember that the choice of a reference node will not change LMPs, but it will change 
congestion components and loss components in AC systems.  Therefore, in an energy-only power system, the 
reference node is arbitrary, but when financial settlements are made based on components of LMP (in AC systems, 
congestion and losses), the choice is not longer arbitrary.  See Litvinov, et al, 2004. 
 APPENDIX B 
DATA 
Table 2. Transmission System Data 
 Node to Reference 0?2 1?2 3?2 4?2 
Line Resistance Line Flow % 
(Generator Shift 
Factors) 
    
0 0.0281  54% -13% 35% 51% 
1 0.0304  25% 7% -19% 17% 
2 0.0064  21% 6% -16% -68% 
3 0.0108  54% 87% 35% 51% 
4 0.0297  -46% -13% -65% -49% 
5 0.0297  -21% -6% 16% -32% 
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Table 3. Defaults Scenarios’ Power System Parameters 
Line Limit  Node Load 
0 1,500  0 3,500 
1 1,500  1 2,500 
2 2,500  2 1,000 
3 1,000  3 1,000 
4 500  4 500 
5 1,000    
 
 
 
 Table 4. Scenario 1 Cleared All-Bid-In, Portfolio Results 
 Plant 0 Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3 Plant 4 
Agent MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M 
0 500 $121.03 0 500 $108.16 0 252.9 $80 1 500 $150 1 0 $123.45 0
1 500 $121.03 0 500 $108.16 0 500 $80 1 500 $150 0 0 $123.45 0
2 500 $121.03 0 500 $108.16 0 0 $80 0 500 $150 1 0 $123.45 0
3 500 $121.03 0 500 $108.16 0 500 $80 1 247.1 $150 1 0 $123.45 0
4 500 $121.03 0 500 $108.16 0 500 $80 1 0 $150 0 0 $123.45 0
 
Table 5. Scenario 1 Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal Prices 
LMPs    
Node Energy Congestion Price 
0 $80 $43.45 $123.45
1 $80 $70 $150
2 $80 $0 $80
3 $80 $28.16 $108.16
4 $80 $41.03 $121.03
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Table 6. Scenario 1 Cleared All-Bid-In, Transmission Line Flows 
Line Flows   
Line MW Flow Capacity (+/-) 
0 -247.1 1500 
1 -872.7 1500 
2 -2380.2 2500 
3 -1000 1000 
4 -247.1 500 
5 380.2 1000 
 
 
 
 Table 7. Scenario 1 Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal MWs 
Nodal Net Loads     
Node Total Generation Competitive Generation Load Net Import 
0 0 0 3500 -3500
1 1747.1 1747.1 2500 -752.9
2 1752.9 1752.9 1000 752.9
3 2500 2500 1000 1500
4 2500 2500 500 2000
 
Table 8. Scenario 1, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Agent Quantity Offers 
Agent Plant 0 Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3 Plant 4 
0 500 500 0 500 500 
1 500 500 0 500 500 
2 500 500 500 0 500 
3 500 500 0 500 500 
4 500 500 500 500 500 
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Table 9. Scenario 1, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Portfolio Results 
  Plant 0 Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3  Plant 4  
Agent MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M 
0 500 $511.58  0 500 $40 1 0 $1,955.79 0 500 $1,572.63 0 52.6 $600 1
1 500 $511.58  0 500 $40 0 0 $1,955.79 0 500 $1,572.63 0 500 $600 0
2 500 $511.58  0 447.4 $40 1 500 $1,955.79 0 0 $1,572.63 0 0 $600 0
3 500 $511.58  0 500 $40 1 0 $1,955.79 0 500 $1,572.63 0 0 $600 0
4 500 $511.58  0 500 $40 1 500 $1,955.79 0 500 $1,572.63 0 0 $600 0
 
 
 
 
 Table 10. Scenario 1 Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal Prices 
LMPs       
Node Energy Congestion Price 
0 $1,955.79 ($1,355.79) $600.00 
1 $1,955.79 ($383.16) $1,572.63 
2 $1,955.79 $0.00 $1,955.79 
3 $1,955.79 ($1,915.79) $40.00 
4 $1,955.79 ($1,444.21) $511.58 
 
Table 11. Scenario 1, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Transmission Line Flows 
Line Flows     
Line MW Flow Capacity (+/-) 
0 0 1500 
1 -706.8 1500 
2 -2240.5 2500 
3 -500 1000 
4 -500 500 
5 240.5 1000 
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Table 12. Scenario 1, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal MWs 
Nodal Net Loads         
Node Total Generation Competitive Generation Load Net Import 
0 552.6 552.6 3500 -2947.4 
1 2000 2000 2500 -500 
2 1000 1000 1000 0 
3 2447.4 2447.4 1000 1447.4 
4 2500 2500 500 2000 
 
 
 Table 13. Scenario 2, Cleared All-Bid-In, Portfolio Results 
  Plant 0 Plant 1 Plant 2  Plant 3 Plant 4 
Agent MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M 
0 500 $150.00 0 500 $150.00 0 500 $150.00 0 0 $150.00 0 0 $150.00 0 
1 500 $150.00 0 500 $150.00 0 500 $150.00 0 11.5 $150.00 1 0 $150.00 0 
2 500 $150.00 0 500 $150.00 0 500 $150.00 0 488.5 $150.00 1 0 $150.00 0 
3 500 $150.00 0 500 $150.00 0 500 $150.00 0 0 $150.00 0 0 $150.00 0 
4 500 $150.00 0 500 $150.00 0 500 $150.00 0 500 $150.00 0 0 $150.00 0 
 
Table 14. Scenario 2, Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal Prices 
Node Energy Congestion Price 
0 $150.00 $0.00 $150.00  
1 $150.00 $0.00 $150.00  
2 $150.00 $0.00 $150.00  
3 $150.00 $0.00 $150.00  
4 $150.00 $0.00 $150.00  75
 
Table 15. Scenario 2, Cleared All-Bid-In, Transmission Line Flows 
Line MW Flow Capacity (+/-) 
0 -11.5 1500 
1 -409.2 1500 
2 -1579.3 2500 
3 -1000 1000 
4 -11.5 500 
5 79.3 1000 
 
  
 
Table 16. Scenario 2, Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal MWs 
Node Total Generation Competitive Generation Load Net Import 
0 1500 1500 3500 -2000 
1 1511.5 1511.5 2500 -988.5 
2 1988.5 1988.5 1000 988.5 
3 1500 1500 1000 500 
4 2000 2000 500 1500 
 
Table 17. Scenario 2, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Agent Quantity Offers 
Agent Plant 0 Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3 Plant 4 
0 500 500 500 0 500 
1 500 500 500 0 500 
2 500 500 500 0 500 
3 500 500 500 0 500 
4 500 500 500 500 0 
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Table 18. Scenario 2, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Portfolio Results 
  Plant 0  Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3 Plant 4 
Agent MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M 
0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 
1 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 1 
2 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 
3 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 
4 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 
 
 
 
 Table 19. Scenario 2, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal Prices 
Node Energy Congestion Price 
0 $600.00 $0.00 $600.00  
1 $600.00 $0.00 $600.00  
2 $600.00 $0.00 $600.00  
3 $600.00 $0.00 $600.00  
4 $600.00 $0.00 $600.00  
 
Table 20. Scenario 2, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Transmission Line Flows 
Line MW Flow Capacity (+/-) 
0 -75 1500 
1 -375 1500 
2 -1550 2500 
3 -575 1000 
4 -75 500 
5 50 1000 77
 
Table 21. Scenario 2, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal MWs 
Node Total Generation Competitive Generation Load Net Import 
0 1500 1500 3500 -2000 
1 2000 2000 2500 -500 
2 1500 1500 1000 500 
3 1500 1500 1000 500 
4 2000 2000 500 1500 
 
 
 Table 22. Scenario 3, Cleared All-Bid-In, Portfolio Results 
Agent MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M 
0 500 $129.54 0 500 $94.00 0 500 $80.00 0 315.4 $150.00 1 0 $132.77 0 
1 500 $129.54 0 500 $94.00 0 500 $80.00 0 500 $150.00 0 0 $132.77 0 
2 500 $129.54 0 500 $94.00 0 500 $80.00 0 0 $150.00 0 0 $132.77 0 
3 500 $129.54 0 500 $94.00 0 500 $80.00 0 500 $150.00 0 0 $132.77 0 
4 500 $129.54 0 500 $94.00 0 184.6 $80.00 1 0 $150.00 0 0 $132.77 0 
 
Table 23. Scenario 3, Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal Prices 
Node Energy Congestion Price 
0 $80.00 $49.54 $129.54  
1 $80.00 $14.00 $94.00  
2 $80.00 $0.00 $80.00  
3 $80.00 $70.00 $150.00  
4 $80.00 $52.77 $132.77  
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Table 24. Scenario 3, Cleared All-Bid-In, Transmission Line Flows 
Line MW Flow Capacity (+/-) 
0 -684.6 1500 
1 -394.9 1500 
2 79.5 2500 
3 -684.6 1000 
4 500 500 
5 420.5 1000 
 
 
 Table 25. Scenario 3, Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal MWs 
Node Total Generation Competitive Generation Load Net Import 
0 2500 2500 3500 -1000 
1 2500 2500 2500 0 
2 2184.6 2184.6 1000 1184.6 
3 1315.4 1315.4 1000 315.4 
4 0 0 500 -500 
 
Table 26. Scenario 3, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Agent Quantity Offers 
Agent Plant 0 Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3 Plant 4 
0 500 500 0 500 500 
1 500 500 500 0 500 
2 500 500 0 500 500 
3 500 500 500 0 500 
4 500 500 500 500 500 
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Table 27. Scenario 3, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Portfolio Results 
  Plant 0  Plant 1 Plant 2 Plant 3 Plant 4 
Agent MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M MW Price M 
0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 
1 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 1 
2 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 
3 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 
4 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 500 $600.00 0 0 $600.00 0 
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Table 28. Scenario 3, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal Prices 
Node Energy Congestion Price 
0 $600.00 $0.00 $600.00  
1 $600.00 $0.00 $600.00  
2 $600.00 $0.00 $600.00  
3 $600.00 $0.00 $600.00  
4 $600.00 $0.00 $600.00  
 
Table 29. Scenario 3, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Transmission Line Flows 
Line MW Flow Capacity (+/-) 
0 -365.0 1500 
1 -345.0 1500 
2 -290.0 2500 
3 -365.0 1000 
4 135 500 
5 290.0 1000 
 
Table 30. Scenario 3, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal MWs 
Node Total Generation Competitive Generation Load Net Import 
0 2,500 2,500 3,500 -1,000 
1 2,500 2,500 2,500 0 
2 1,500 1,500 1,000 500 
3 1,500 1,500 1,000 500 
4 500 500 500 0 
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